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The word “charity” can mean many things to many people. The legal definition is 
inevitably rather complex and for the layperson, the general notion of charity is that of 
benevolence and philanthropy, and whilst the legal meaning and the layperson’s 
meaning of charity may diverge in some respects,1 it is widely accepted that the social 
construct of charity is seen as “means of redressing wrongs in society”2 so where “a 
State may have been unable to provide a function or service, charity could fill that 
void, and the voids would depend on the government and policies at the time.”3  It 
would also be fair to say that the four heads of charity, as will be addressed shortly, 
are rooted in government policy.4  Whilst this notion of redressing societal wrongs 
has been subject to some criticism, in particular that of Victorian society, where 
attempts were made to distinguish between the deserving poor and the undeserving 
poor and who should be most entitled to receive charitable gifts, and whilst the 
inherent issues relating to the concept of charity generally are outside the scope of this 
article, it is undoubtedly correct that charity itself is recognised as a socially cohesive 
part of society, both in terms of its origins, where charity “has been seen from the 
earliest days of Christianity as one of the central tenets of the Christian faith”5 to 
contemporary times, where the central obligation is to put others first, thus engaging 
the ephemeral concept of the spirit of charity. 
 
One of the most recent examples of this is the call from the internationally renowned 
charity organisation Oxfam to make donations to help those suffering as a result of 
the super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013.6  Such calls for 
donations to provide aid in times of crisis is perhaps one of the most socially 
recognised and accepted schemes of charity, perhaps because this appears to underpin 
the ethos of charity, that of assisting others, even at the expense of foregoing one’s 
own comforts in order to do so.  It is immediately recognised that such organisations 
are relieving a need and as such fulfil a fundamental role in society, and such 
“charitable endeavours are to be encouraged”7 because society “is unlikely to be 
prejudiced by attempts at public benefaction”.8  As a result therefore, it may come as 
some surprise to some that professional bodies and societies, whose functions are not 
necessarily viewed as fitting in with the traditional construct of “charity”, as having 
charitable status.                                                          
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This article seeks to assess the public benefit of such bodies, a legal requirement for 
any registered charity, and asks whether these bodies and organisations fulfil the 
notion of the spirit of charity as perhaps might be more closely associated with the 
more ideological charities such as Oxfam and the Salvation Army.  This article will 
firstly outline, briefly, the concept of charitable purpose and public benefit, and will 
then address two issues.  Firstly, the functions of such bodies, and how the courts 
have interpreted those functions in relation to the public/private benefit dichotomy, 
and secondly, the consideration of the protection of the public in relation to the 




It is common knowledge that the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth set out the first 
non-exhaustive list of purposes deemed to be charitable, thus providing the 
foundations of contemporary charity law, and then later that the seminal case of 
Commissioner for the Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel9 set out the now 
infamous four heads of charity, as codified in s 5(1) of the Charities Act 2005, where 
charitable purposes are defined as the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, 
the advancement of religion and any other matter beneficial to the community.  
However, at no stage has there ever been a statutory definition of charity,10 and whilst 
“the question of what constitutes a charitable purpose often strikes different minds 
differently”,11 the law requires that in order for an organisation to obtain registered 
charitable status, it must have a charitable character, it must exist for the benefit of the 
public and must be exclusively charitable.12   
 
For the first three heads of charity, it is thought that the public benefit is assumed to 
arise, unless the contrary can be established, although this does not mean that “the 
existence of a public benefit is a foregone conclusion.”13  What it means instead is 
that “the question whether a gift is or may be operative for the public benefit is a 
question to be answered by the Court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before 
it.”14  With regard to the fourth head of charity, the presumption of public benefit 
does not arise and such public benefit “must be expressly shown an must be 
sufficiently within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth to be a 
charitable purpose.”15  It is now to this issue of public benefit that this article turns in 
relation to the first matter for consideration, that of the purpose of the functions of 
professional bodies and the considerations of the courts in relation to concerns of 
private or public benefit. 
 
Professional Bodies, Functions and the Spirit of Charity 
                                                         
9 Commissioner for the Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531. 
10 Sue Tappenden and Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Equity, Trusts and Succession” (2013, ThomsonReuters, 
Wellington) Chapter 7, publication forthcoming. 
11 Susan Barker The Presumption of Charitability, above n **, at 296. 
12 New Zealand Computer Society Inc HC WN CIV-2010-485-924 [28 February 2011] at [10]-[12]. 
13 New Zealand Computer Society Inc, above n **, at [13]. 
14 New Zealand Computer Society Inc, above n **, at [13], citing Molloy v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [1981] 1 NZLR 688 at 695; see also Re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237 at 242. 
15 Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Charities Law in New Zealand” (2014 ThomsonReuters, Wellington) 
Chapter 2 publication forthcoming. 
This article does not seek to set out an exhaustive list of all cases relating to 
professional bodies that have come before the courts, rather it will address some of 
the key cases and critically review the question of spirit of charity in relation to their 
objects and functions, starting with The Royal College of Surgeons of England v 
National Provincial Bank.16  In this case, one of the questions for the House of Lords 
was whether the College was a charity at law, and that decision rested primarily on 
the construction of the constituent documents of the College, particularly the charter 
granted by King George III in 1800.  That document conferred powers and duties for 
the appointment of officers and for the general carrying on as a college, but it did not 
set out the objects of the College.  Instead, the Court one of the recitals that set out a 
number of objects, including the “study and practice of the art and science of 
surgery”.17  The Court interpreted such an object as signifying:18 
 
[T]he acquisition of knowledge and skill in surgery both by abstract study and by the 
exercise of the art in the dissecting room and the anatomy theatre, and they are 
capable of covering both the discovery of new knowledge, and which is the fruits of 
research, and the learning of existing knowledge either by students who are 
qualifying or by qualified surgeons desirous of improving their knowledge and skill. 
 
On that construction therefore the Court held that the objects fell either within the 
advancement of education or science, and thus were charitable.  It is not hard to 
recognise the significance to the public of such objects and thus, whilst at first sight, 
the “study and practice of the art and science of surgery” may mean merely the 
“academic study and professional practice of the art and science of surgery”,19 with 
rather more limited public benefit, the House of Lords was of the view that the full 
benefit to the public should be found in the objects of the College so as to relieve 
human suffering, or to advance education or science to that end also.20  It was argued 
that a power to make by-laws for the regulation, governance and advantage of the 
college actually would confer private benefits on members of the college, in other 
words, it may further members’ professional interests.  However, Lord Normand 
firmly rebutted that consideration, noting:21 
 
The professional advantage which might accrue to individuals from the protection 
promised them in the exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by 
them as diplomates of the college is but the inevitable and incidental result of a 
provision intended to secure the dignity and honour of the college to which they owe 
their diploma. 
 
In other words, the disciplinary power is actually necessary to ensure the success and 
good name of the College, and merely incidentally advantageous to individuals.  
Whilst the general rule is that for an entity to be charitable, it must have exclusively 
charitable purposes, if there are purposes that ancillary to the overall purpose that are 
non charitable, this will not necessarily defeat the determination of its charitable 
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nature.22  Thus if the ancillary non charitable purposes “lack substance in their own 
right and amount to no more than something which tends to assist, or which naturally 
goes with, the achievement of the main purpose”,23 then the ancillary non charitable 
purpose will not defeat the acquisition of charitable status.  Returning then to the 
Royal College of Surgeons, this incidental private benefit to its members was not 
sufficient to negative the claim of charitability of the College. 
 
It is not difficult to see how a court may find such that the objects and functions of 
such a professional body as the Royal College of Surgeons as having sufficient public 
benefit because of its intrinsic purpose of preventing human suffering, thus it 
inevitably encompasses the spirit of charity.24  What is perhaps more challenging in 
terms of aligning such functions to the traditional spirit of charity are cases relating to 
law reporting, to which this article now turns. 
 
In the case of Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v 
Attorney-General,25 the Court of Appeal held that the Council was a charitable entity.  
The purposes of the Council, inter alia, were to prepare and publish reports of judicial 
decisions and issue, from time to time, other publications relevant to legal decisions.  
It was contended that main purpose of the Council was to advance the interests of the 
legal profession by providing them with tools of their trade, thus providing only a 
private benefit.  Russell LJ contended however that he was:26 
 
…not persuaded of the validity of this contention.  It seems to me that if the 
publication of reliable reports of decisions of the courts is for the benefit of the 
community and of general public utility in the charitable sense, it is an inevitable and 
indeed necessary step in the achievement of that benefit that the members of the legal 
profession are supplied with the tools of the trade. 
 
Thus in his Honour’s view, the benefit to individuals was merely ancillary to the 
overall benefit to the public, although his Honour did dissent from his colleagues on 
the point that the Council advanced education.  
 
His learned colleage Sachs LJ was of the view that the argument that the benefits 
were overtly private might be attractive because judges would be anxious not to 
favour their preferred profession,27 thus inevitably leading one to presume that the 
spirit of charity is vitally missing from such an organisation.  However, Sachs J then 
likened the purposes of the publication of law reports and equipping of lawyers with 
their professional tools to that of a doctor studying medical research papers in order to 
treat his patients effectively and indeed earn fees.28   As a result, it would be difficult 
to say “that because doctors earn their emoluments the printing and sale of such 
papers by a[n]…institution could not be held for the advancement of education in                                                         
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medicine.”29  Thus by analogy, the purpose of producing a book or report to enable 
the education of a professional person must fall within the constraints of charity law, 
and that “remains its purpose despite the fact that professional men…use the 
knowledge acquired to earn their living.”30  The analogy to the medical profession 
therefore brings the purpose of the Council of Law Reporting within the traditional 
concept of the spirit of charity, that of assisting others for the public good.  So whilst 
at first sight, the public benefit may be appear intangible and at odds with traditional 
views of charity, “[o]ne must not confuse the results flowing from the achievement of 
a purpose with the purpose itself, any more than one should have regard to the 
motives of those who set that purpose in motion.”31   
 
The later New Zealand case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v New Zealand 
Council of Law Reporting relied on its earlier English counterpart to determine that 
the New Zealand Council of Law Reporting was a charitable body.  Richardson J, 
delivering the judgment for the Court noted, referring to the Court of Appeal 
decision:32 
 
The service which publication of The Law Reports provides benefits not only those 
actively engaged in the practice and administration of the law, but also those whose 
business it is to study and teach law academically, and many others who need to 
study the law for the purposes of their trades, businesses, professions or affairs. In all 
these fields, however, the nature of the service is the same: it enables the reader to 
study, and by study to acquaint himself with and instruct himself in the law of this 
country. There is nothing here which negatives an exclusively charitable purpose. 
 
Richardson J then applied that statement directly to the case at hand and the New 
Zealand Council of Law Reporting, noting that “is the Council’s principle function” 
thus the principle functions of the Council pertain to the publication and sale of law 
reports for the benefit of those engaged “in the administration and practice of law”.33  
It is clear then that there is great public benefit in enabling persons to acquaint and 
instruct themselves in the law and whilst it could be argued that such purposes may at 
first seem at odds with the traditional notions of the spirit of charity, one must 
consider in reality that spirit and its underlying ethos.  Charitable endeavours should 
be encouraged; they support society and promote humanity and such public 
benefaction should not be denied, however odd it may appear.34 
 
That is not say that all professional bodies that purport to encompass charitable 
purposes will actually meet the requisite public benefit requirement.  In the case of 
Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Inc v Commissioner of New 
Zealand (IPENZ),35 the High Court came to the conclusion that the institute                                                         
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performed a “significant professional role which produces private benefits to its 
members which are far from incidental to or subsidiary to the learned-society 
function.”36  This case highlights the notion that whilst the spirit of charity may be a 
very wide concept, there are limits to its ability to encompass all applicants, and that 
the doctrine of public benefit is the key to authenticating the concept of the spirit of 
charity.  The object of IPENZ is to advance science and the profession of engineering, 
and Tipping J was not of the initial view that such a construction would be fatal to 
IPENZ obtaining charitable status because this does not necessarily mean that the 
institute was established for the advancement of its members in the profession.37   
 
However, on full analysis of the institute’s documents and publications, Tipping J 
concluded that IPENZ was “definitely and distinctly a professional body.”38  Its 
purposes are to act as a professional organisation for the benefit of its members, and 
whilst there were undoubtedly distinct public benefits in the objects and purpose of 
IPENZ, the private benefits that it offers its members could not be construed as 
incidental.  This then enabled the Court to distinguish the instant case from the Royal 
College of Surgeons case, where the private benefits to members were incidental to 
the overall purpose, and the spirit of charity was clearly deeply embedded within that 
body’s purposes.   What is interesting however is that Tipping J found that another 
medically associated case, that of the Royal College of Nursing v St Marylebone 
Corporation,39 difficult to reconcile with preceding cases.  It is pertinent to turn our 
attention for a moment to Tipping J’s evaluation of the Royal College of Nursing case.  
 
His Honour referred to the opinion of Romer LJ, where his Lordship stated that the 
crucial question in regarding the objects was whether the object advanced nursing or 
the interests of the nurses.40  The Court did not concern itself with what the College 
actually did, instead, it only concerned itself with construction of the words of the 
charter of the College, in spite of evidence that one of its objects was to promote the 
profession of nursing.  In summary, the Court in the Nursing case found that private 
benefits that may accrue to the nurses were incidental to its overall charitable purpose, 
even though the College expressly sought to advance the profession of nursing in all 
or any of its branches.41  Tipping J found this case difficult to reconcile then 
previously decided cases clearly because the private benefit issue was not addressed 
adequately in his own view and it did not sit comfortably alongside such cases as the 
Royal College of Surgeons case, and he urged caution when considering its 
applicability.42 
 
Whilst the Court in Royal College of Nursing evidently established public benefit in 
line with other medical bodies, the caution offered by Tipping J in IPENZ suggests                                                         
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that whilst the spirit of charity may appear to run inherently through such cases, 
charity law may not automatically recognise it, and indeed, the law is perhaps 
required to make more detailed enquiries to ensure that the public benefit is met and 
in doing so, this then will underpin the spirit of charity.  Perhaps then a more pertinent 
approach for a court in cases such as these where there is doubt as to a body’s objects 
in the terms of its documents is to look at what that body or society actually does, so 
the enquiry is then as to the purpose for which it was established.43 It is evident that 
the Court in the Royal College of Nursing case chose not to make such enquiries and 
in doing so did not fully recognise the real relevance of public benefit, thus 
disassociating it from the spirit of charity; the spirit of charity being to provide 
succour to those in need, not to provide overt private benefit. 
 
Returning then to the instant case of IPENZ, Tipping J was not of the view that the 
Royal College of Nursing case would assist IPENZ for the reasons set out above, and 
instead, his Honour noted that if he were to view the objects of the institute in 
isolation, then it is very likely that he would have concluded that it provided non-
ancillary private benefits.  After reviewing the activities of the institute, unfortunately 
at least for the institute, that “evidence simply fortifies the conclusion to which I 
would have come when looking at the words of the object alone.”44  IPENZ was 
evidently therefore performing a significant professional role and could not be 
construed as charitable.45   
 
Here then is evidence of the requisite public benefit being profoundly absent from a 
professional body and the one case that may have been of assistance to it, that of the 
Royal College of Nursing, was determined as being of uncertain validity because, in 
Tipping J’s view, the Court in that case chose to focus on the charter, instead of the 
activities.  The activities of IPENZ, and possibly the Royal College of Nursing, do not 
appear to support the spirit of charity, and equally so, appeared to provide little in the 
way of public benefit.  It would appear that without public benefit, there can be no 
spirit of charity, and vice versa, thus whilst some case law appears at odds with the 
traditional concepts of charity, courts are able to determine, in most circumstances, 
the true purpose of those professional bodies, and thus the spirit of charity appears 
still to be alive and well. 
 
However, the challenging High Court case of Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers 
Board v Charities Registration Board46 (PGDB) delivered in 2013 provides a 
contemporary view of the notion of the private/public benefit dichotomy and from 
this case we may be able to ascertain how the spirit of charity sits in what might be 
construed as unusual circumstances.  The Board of Plumbers, Gasfitters and 
Drainlayers appears, prima facie, far removed in terms of public benefit and the spirit 
of charity, from such bodies as the Royal College of Surgeons, Nurses and indeed 
Councils of Law Reporting.  Nonetheless, any such perceptions may have been firmly 
quashed by the judgment of Goddard J. 
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The PGDB was established under s 133 of the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers 
Act 2003 (PGDA) and registered as a charitable entity by the former Charities 
Commission in 2008.47  “In broad terms, the PGDB is responsible for regulating 
sanitary plumbing, gasfitting and drainlaying (the subject industries).48  Section 3 of 
the PGDA provides that the purpose of the PGDA is to, inter alia, protect the health 
and safety of the public by ensuring the competency of those who engage in the 
services outlined and also to regulate those same people in those services.  Section 
137 of the PGDA sets out the functions of the PGDB, and these include prescribing 
the minimum standards for registration as a service provider, renewing licences, 
making arrangements for examinations, hearing complaints and disciplinary matters 
and to institute prosecutions against those who may breach the Act.49  In 2012, the 
Board of the Department of Internal Affairs – Charities (DIAC) deregistered the 
PGDB after reviewing its purposes and activities and determining that the PGDB did 
not qualify for registration.  The Board’s reasoning was that the PGDB’s regulation to 
protect the health and safety of the public through the regulation of the subject 
industries was not an exclusive purpose as it had an independent purpose that 
benefited its members significantly. 
 
This paper will consider firstly the issues pertaining to the public/private dichotomy 
as raised by the Court, and the second part of the article will consider the issues 
pertaining to the protection of the public. 
 
An important aspect of the Board’s decision to deregister the PGDB was that the 
PGDB differed substantially from the case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Medical Council of New Zealand,50 where the Court of Appeal found that the Medical 
Council was a charitable body.51  Goddard J considered it instructive to deliberate 
these determinations in detail. 
 
The key issue for Goddard J was to ascertain whether the purpose of the functions of s 
137 of the PGDA benefit those working in the industry or the public.  In her Honour’s 
opinion, each of the functions:52  
 
…is directed to promoting the proper regulation of the regulated trades in order to 
ensure those operating within it are competent and therefore the health and safety of 
the public is therefore safeguarded, so far as possible. 
 
Thus whilst the functions will undoubtedly benefit those working in the industry, the 
main purpose is to maintain the safety standards to protect the public.  These 
functions were also “markedly similar to the functions of the Medical Council of New 
Zealand.”53   The Medical Council of New Zealand was established under the                                                         
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Medical Practitioners Act 1950 and continued under the Medical Practitioners Act 
1968 and its main functions are as follows:54 
 
(a) The maintenance of a formal system of registration of medical practitioners. 
(b) The maintenance of discipline within the medical profession. 
(c) The accreditation and surveillance of appropriate undergraduate and postgraduate 
education of medical practitioners. 
(d) The suspension of impaired medical practitioners and the maintenance of systems 
for identifying, monitoring and rehabilitating impaired medical practitioners. 
(e) The provision of statistical information to the Minister of Health. 
 
As has already been noted, the role of medical professional bodies as charitable 
institutions is not uncommon as their benefit to the public generally is readily 
acknowledged by the courts, and thus the spirit of charity can be easily recognised in 
their functions.  What is most interesting then is Goddard J’s comparison of the 
functions of a medical body with that of the PGDB, which, without wishing to 
denigrate the functions of the a very important body, would not automatically strike 
the public has having the same sort of role of medical bodies.  Nonetheless, it would 
appear that public benefit and the spirit of charity can be found in even the less 
glamorous professional bodies, as perhaps they rightly should, as will become 
apparent from the discussions. 
 
Goddard J notes that the functions of the PGDB “a markedly similar to the functions 
of the Medical Council of New Zealand”55 and she makes reference to the opinion of 
McKay J in the Medical Council case, who states:56 
 
I readily accept … that a principal function of the council is to provide and maintain a 
register of qualified medical practitioners. I can also accept that the maintenance of 
such a register is beneficial to those whose names are included in it… it does not 
follow, however, that these benefits were either the purpose of the legislation or the 
purpose of the establishment of the council. The restriction of the right to practise 
under the recognised descriptions, and the provision for registration of only those 
who are properly qualified, would seem to have as their obvious and primary focus 
the protection of the public … 
 
In Goddard J’s view, the very same analysis can be applied to the instant case.  The 
functions of the PGDB “may increase public confidence and thereby provide a flow-
on benefit to those working in the subject industries.”57 However, those benefits were 
“purely collateral and incidental consequences inherent within a system of 
registration.”58  In fact, neither the Board nor the respondent were able to point to any 
of the functions or activities that were carried out by the PGDB that provided sole 
benefits to those working in those industries. 
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Although the Court in the instant case did not make reference to the following views 
of the Medical Council case, I think them worth mentioning as a relevant point of 
analogy.  Thomas J (as was) noted:59 
 
It is my opinion that the medical council was established by Parliament for the 
purpose of protecting and promoting the health of the community. Parliament was 
seeking to in part discharge the established responsibility of the state for the 
maintenance of the health of its citizens. No other purpose can reasonably be ascribed 
to it in enacting the legislation. But this responsibility cannot be met, Parliament 
clearly determined, unless high standards are maintained in the practice of medicine 
and surgery. A system for the registration and disciplining of qualified medical 
practitioners was equally clearly seen to be necessary to achieve that objective. 
Hence, the medical council was established and vested with the function of 
registering medical practitioners and disciplining those whose conduct falls short of 
an acceptable standard. 
 
In a similar fashion, the PGDB was undoubtedly established for the purposes of 
protecting and promoting the health of the community; without its subject industries 
society would be much the poorer in terms of health and facilities.  Thus it is without 
doubt equally as valuable in its role in society as any medical or legal professional 
body and the spirit of charity may be found equally as positively in its purposes as its 
analogous bodies. 
 
Goddard J then turned to the IPENZ case as a “useful comparison in relation to 
welfare services.”60  In that case, Tipping J referred to a corporate plan that set out a 
committee for employment and welfare, with subsidiary functions of that committee 
being conducting surveys of salaries and employment benefits, overviews of 
conditions and pay and the conduct of an employment advisory service.  This plan 
also included detailing promoting the profession and its contribution to society.  
Goddard J however firmly distinguished IPENZ from the PGDB case by asserting that 
if the PGDB were established for similar purposes to the IPENZ, in other words, to 
benefit those members working within the subject industries, then it would be 
expected that s 137 of the PGDA would have made such provisions for similar 
services.61  Whilst “IPENZ is a clear example of an institution established for the 
advantage and in the interests of those working in the subject industries”62 it is 
apparent that the PGDB follows the same ethos of the Medical Council of New 
Zealand, and indeed the Royal College of Surgeons; their public benefit should not be 
undermined by merely incidental consequences of the provision of private benefits 
that come from the registration of their members.  The reality is that those benefits are 
not the purpose of registration.  The overall value to the public is the essence of these 
professional bodies, and that value to society cannot be underestimated, thus the spirit 
of charity is alive and well within these bodies. 
 
We now turn to the second matter for this article, that of the protection of the public 
in relation to their services. 
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The Protection of the Public, Professional Bodies and the Spirit of Charity 
 
In many of the cases involving professional bodies that are found to be charitable, 
there can be seen an implicit acknowledgement that the professional body offers some 
kind of protection to the public as a result of its existence.  For instance, the Royal 
College of Surgeons prevents suffering in humans and the Councils of Law Reporting 
ensure that the public have adequate legal protection, however, these cases do not 
explicitly address these key matters, they merely imply that such services will protect 
the public and so it is shrouded in the doctrine of public benefit.  It is beyond doubt 
that such protection fully embraces the full ethos of the spirit of charity.  Another 
early example of this type of implied protection can also be found in the case of 
McGregor v Commissioner of Stamp Duties.63   
 
In this case, the Court had to determine if a gift to the New Zealand Obstetrical 
Society was a valid charitable gift.  Its activities included providing ante-natal 
pamphlets to expectant mothers and the education of the public on maternal welfare in 
New Zealand.64  Smith J determined that the real object of the Society was the 
promotion of the scientific study of obstetrics and gynaecology in New Zealand, thus 
its essence was to provide education in the treatment and care of maternity cases for a 
large section of the community,65 and this was sufficient to recognise its charitability 
at law.  Clearly there is fundamental protection being offered to expectant mothers 
and their offspring as a result of the functions of this Society, but this is only implied, 
whereas in fact, this benefit is actually the stratum of the functions.  Whilst this is 
clearly a very positive function and one that embraces the spirit of charity, it is 
perhaps surprising that it is not addressed explicitly, until that is the PGBD case.  This 
case addresses this issue thoroughly and highlights explicitly how the spirit of charity 
exists within these decisions. 
 
The Court affirmed that the principle issue in this case is whether this body’s 
purposes are charitable under the fourth head of charity, that of “any other matter 
beneficial to the community.” There are two requirements under this head and these 
are:66 
 
(a) the purposes of the trust must be such as to confer a benefit on the public or a 
section of the public; and 
(b) the class of persons eligible to benefit must constitute the public or a sufficient 
section of the public. 
 
The first limb of the test was met, as discussed above, as there was clear public 
benefit in the PGDB’s regulation of the subject industries, and the class of persons 
that benefit from such regulations constitutes a sufficient section of the public.67 
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The second limb of the test will be met if the purpose of the body falls within the 
spirit and intendment of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth.  It is worthwhile just 
noting the list of charitable uses in that Preamble:68 
 
The relief of the aged, impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in 
universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and 
highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock or maintenance 
of houses of correction; the marriages of poor maids; the supportation, aid and help of 
young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; the relief or redemption of 
prisoners or captives and the aid and ease of any poor inhabitants concerning 
payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes. 
 
Goddard J in the PGDB case noted that the requirement to be charitable within the 
spirit and intendment of the Preamble may be met in two ways: firstly, if a purpose is 
analogous to a purpose that has already been held to be within the spirit and 
intendment of the Preamble, and secondly, the charitable nature will be presumed if 
its objects beneficial to the public are at first sight within the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble.69  In addressing this test, Goddard J stated that the “most efficient way 
of addressing this issue is to consider whether the PGDB’s purpose is analogous to a 
purpose that has previously been held to be within the spirit and intendment of the 
Preamble.”70 
 
Goddard J illustrates my views concerning the lack of explicit public protection 
eloquently.  Her Honour referred once again to the Medical Council case as it was 
noted that their purposes are analogous to those of the PGDB.   It was determined by 
the Court that the purpose of the PGDB is to regulate for the protection of the public, 
similarly to the Medical Council of New Zealand.  The Board endeavoured to 
distinguish the Medical Council case from that of the instant case because it 
“considered the protection of the public in respect of quality of medical and surgical 
services as distinguishable from maintaining professional standards within the subject 
industries.”71 
 
However, Goddard J asserted that this approach by the Board rather missed the point, 
as “this analysis of the PGDB’s purpose constitutes only half the picture.”72  As her 
Honour explained, it is artificial to talk of their functions whilst ignoring the intended 
outcomes of those functions, in other words, the intended function being the 
protection of the health and safety of the public.  Here is explicit consideration of the 
value of such a professional body, and thus I would argue that it is beyond doubt that 
such protection is the equivalent to the protection offered by medical and surgical 
professional bodies.73  Goddard J rightly however adds a note of caution, and I 
respectfully agree that “the charitable purpose of protecting the health and safety of 
the public does not extend to all industries of public utility.”74  There must be a line                                                         
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drawn by the Court and this must be understanding which professional body falls 
within the correct side of the line, which is determined by  “examining the quality of 
the protection afforded by the institution or society and the risks against which that 
institution or society is intended to guard.”75 
 
By way of illustration, her Honour referred to the case of Re New Zealand Computer 
Society Inc.76 The Society is a not for profit society that works to advance computer-
related education and its professional development.77  In this case, the Court, whilst 
acknowledging that the public may derive some remote benefit from the Society’s 
promotion of education amongst its professionals, that benefit was merely ancillary to 
its overall purposes.  Its functions could not be compared directly to the Medical 
Council case, because the registration of medical professionals ensured high standards 
of practice and thus was a primary and direct public benefit.  Undoubtedly IT is of 
great importance in modern day life but MacKenzie J could not be persuaded that its 
importance could be equated “with the medical profession or the nursing profession 
so far as the public interest in the maintenance of high standards in the profession is 
concerned.”78  Evidently the spirit of charity does not find its place in the standards of 
IT professionals, and this is demonstrated in the lack of analogous public benefit in 
comparison with the medical industry. 
 
Returning then to Goddard J’s appraisal of the Computer Society case, this case is 
used to demonstrate how this particular case fell the wrong side of the line of the 
quality of protection afforded by the Society and the risks against which it sought to 
guard.  In contrast however, Goddard J is clearly of the view that the functions of the 
PGBD protect the public from substantial risks and these include:79 
 
the possibility of a gas explosion; the potential impact on drinking water of unsafe 
plumping (sic) practice and the potential risk to public health from unsanitary 
drainage.  
 
Of course, repairing a gas leak and mending pipes involve different skills and training 
from those required to undertake surgical procedures, but surely there can be little 
difference in the level of risk posed to the public if the standards of either profession 
fell below the minimum standard required.  My views find support in the 
determination of Goddard J, as her Honour submitted that “both activities have the 
potential to pose substantial risk to the public if not performed competently.”80  As a 
result therefore, the PGDB established that it fell within the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble by analogy to the medical profession cases.   
 
The protection of the public from any grave health risks surely encompasses the spirit 
of charity.  Whilst the calls for aid from Oxfam in response to the devastating super 
typhoon, and their resulting assistance to those suffering and in need may seem a far 
cry from the purposes of a variety of professional bodies, such as the PGDB, on 
analogy, it is clear how such bodies do in reality have equally valuable roles in                                                         
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society as organisations such as Oxfam, and cases such as the PGDB case validates 
their worth.  It was refreshing to see Goddard J’s explicit reference to the protection 
of the public as being a valid method of assessing whether a purpose falls within the 
spirit and intendment of the Preamble, as whilst this protection has been alluded to in 
the past, I think it is a valuable method of analysis, and it highlights the true value of 
such bodies in a contemporary society.  There may be some criticism that 
contemporary cases such as PGDB may open the flood gates for professional bodies 
that seek charitable status that may in reality not offer such public benefit, however, 
Goddard J made it clear that such cases should be examined to ensure that the quality 
of the protection they offer and they risks against which they guard are of a minimum 
value, and the Medical Council case and the Computer Society case offer valuable 
standards in these respects. 
 
Therefore whilst the role of professional bodies may appear to challenge the ethos of 
charities and the spirit of charities, these decided cases show us that actually the spirit 
of charity is very much alive and well and the services afforded by such professional 
bodies provide a valuable function in today’s complex and demanding world. 
 
 
 
 
 
